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The Europeanization of the political 
system and the public administration 
in Germany
Peter A. Zervakis*
This article is an analysis of the main patterns of institutional continuity and change 
that characterize the German federal political system under the influence of ‘Europeani­
zation’. It shows the different degrees of Europeanization to which the German political 
institutions and public policies have already adapted. Introducing some guiding theoretical 
approaches that have been applied to raise the analytical validity of Europeanization, it 
attempts to explain the range and the degree to which the German state and its domestic 
polities, politics and public policies have been integrated into the EU governance system. 
After analysing the core institutional features of the German federal system which gene­
rally resist European integration, it presents some evidence on the adjustments made to 
the (reunified) German intergovernmental system, designed to further stimulate European 
integration. Finally, it presents a brief summary of the lessons learnt from ‘Europeanizing 
German federalism’, in order to examine whether typical patterns explaining the Europea­
nization of the EU member states can be identified.
Introduction
In 1943, from his exile in the US, the renowned German novelist, Thomas 
Mann, broadcast a warning to the listeners of Radio New York. He claimed
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that Adolf Hitler wanted the ‘Germanization of Europe’ (Knodt 2000: 32,53). 
Contrary to this dreadful vision, Mann dearly wished one day to see the 
‘Europeanization of Germany’. Mann’s then utopian leitmotiv has become 
our modern political reality. Germany has been successfully multilaterally 
tamed (Katzenstein 1997) and has voluntarily integrated its political system 
into the European Union (EU). Thus, the German case has proved that 
integration works by institutionalizing co-operation and transforming its 
member states’ particularistic national interests in the long run:
Crucially, the community idea is not meant to eliminate the national state but 
to create a regime which seeks to tame the national interest with a new 
discipline. The challenge is to control at societal level the uncontrolled reflexes 
of national interest in the international sphere (Weiler as cited in Kohler-Koch 
1998: 269).
But though ‘Europe matters’ (Knill & Lehmkuhl 1999) in German policy­
making and, without doubt, the EU has a clear impact on the German poli­
tical system, especially with regard to the Europeanization of public policies, 
there is a relatively high resistance to domestic institutional and structural 
change prompted by top-down legal interventions originating from Brussels. 
As a consequence, especially in the last decade after unification, Germany 
appears to its European neighbors as the ‘sick man of Europe’ (The Econo­
mist) because of its proven inability to cope economically and politically with 
the liberalization and competition challenges of globalization (Hopt, Kant- 
zenbach, Straubhaar (eds) 2003). The frustrated German political class seems 
internally and externally too weak to assume with some credibility its tradi­
tional locomotive function revitalizing European integration (Kühnhardt 
2003).
In the following, I want to analyze the main patterns of institutional 
continuity and change that characterizes the German federal political system 
under the influence of the somewhat ubiquitous and trendy umbrella term 
‘Europeanization’. The first section, consequently, tries to conceptualize Eu­
ropeanization. The second shows the different degrees of Europeanization to 
which the German political institutions and its public policies have already 
been adapted. It will introduce some guiding theoretical approaches that have 
been applied to raise the analytical validity of Europeanization. They may 
explain to which range and degree the German member state and its domestic 
polities, politics and public policies have been integrated into the EU gover­
nance system. The third section analyses the core institutional features of the
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:05:49 |
The Europeanization of the political system and the public administration in Germany 107
German federal system, including public administration, which generally re­
sist European integration. Then, in the fourth section, some evidence is 
presented on the adjustments made to the (reunified) German intergovern­
mental system, which were designed to further stimulate European integra­
tion after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. Finally, the lessons learnt 
from ‘Europeanizing German federalism’ are briefly summarized, to see whe­
ther typical patterns explaining the Europeanization of the EU member states 
can be located.
The ambivalent nature of Europeanization
There is no general consensus in the scientific community on a valid 
definition of the catch-all term ‘Europeanization’, which has gained some 
popularity in integration studies literature since its introduction in the 1980s 
(Zervakis 2003: 295, footnote 75). Yet many definitions are actually of too 
broad a conception for our purposes: for Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001: 
3) Europeanization means:
... the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures 
of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with 
political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of 
policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.
Also they refer to the equally open concept of the finalité of the EU’s 
emerging political system (Leslie 2002: 218-220) and emphasize too strictly 
the formation of political institutions by elite networking at the EU level. 
Theories, which focus only on an endpoint, risk ignoring the ‘sui generis’ 
process of the multi-level European governance (European Commission 
2001: 11; Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch 2003: 18). In this study, ‘Europeani­
zation’ refers to the ‘EU-isation’ or ‘EU-Europäisierung (Europeanization)’ 
of national institutions (Kohler-Koch 2000: 12, 27) and thus focuses on the 
problem of the ‘central penetration of national systems of governance’ (Olsen 
2002: 923). In any case, the vast majority of empirical literature seems to deal 
with the impact of the EU on the member states’ national political systems 
emphasizing policy rather than institutional change (Jachtenfuchs & Kohler- 
Koch 2003: 36). Therefore, Ladrech’s well-established and broadly accepted 
definition fits better our uses because it rightly points at the adaptive pro­
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cesses of national institutions and their public policies to a changing external 
environment:
Europeanization is an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape 
of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part 
of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making (Ladrech 
1994, 69).
However, Wessels (1997, 36) is more precise, when he defines the term 
‘Europeanization’ as an ongoing and time-consuming process, whereby va­
rious economic, administrative, social and political actors shift the center of 
gravity of decision-making from a traditional, strictly national level to a mul­
ti-level focus that considers the EU as part of the domestic structure. In this 
perspective, the EU acts as ‘a co-formulator for national political choices’ 
(Zervakis & Yannis 2001: 153). This concept looks at European policy not as 
foreign (diplomatic) policy but as an integral part of a new, self-sufficient 
whole, which has not yet reached its final structure. Not that European 
integration is a purely supranational procedure: its eminent protagonists are 
the national governments, and the states remain the ‘masters of the Treaties’ 
(Walter Hallstein). However, the Europeanization of domestic political and 
administrative structures points at a new supranational level, which ideally 
co-exists among the nation states based on a ‘confederal consociation’ (Chrys- 
sochoou 2001: 2, 26-27; Nettesheim 2003: 31). Thus, the relevant actors in the 
domestic scene of the member states (politicians and high-level civil servants) 
need to show a mutual willingness and capability to integrate European 
interactions into their existing domestic policy-planning and policy-making 
patterns without necessarily converging with the institutions at EU-level (Bul- 
mer & Bulmer 2000: 268). Radaelli (2000: 4) expresses this consensus in 
defining ‘EU-Europeanization’ rather convincingly:
Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ 
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the 
making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic dis­
course, identities, political structures and public policies.
Germany’s own way to European Governance
The evaluation of the impact of European integration on the political and 
administrative systems of the nationally organized EU member states has
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initiated growing scholarly interest only in recent years (Borkenhagen et al. 
1992; Goetz 1995; Wessels and Rometsch 1996; Luthardt 1996; Cowles, Ca­
poraso, and Risse 2001: 3; Sturm and Pehle 2001: 249; Knill 2001). This is 
mainly due to the fact that, in public opinion, the nation state organized as a 
parliamentary democracy has for long been identified as the only democratically 
legitimate form of governance (Zervakis 2003: 283). Meanwhile it belongs to 
conventional wisdom in integration studies that Europeanization has influenced 
virtually all sectors of the political system of Germany: from polity (institutions) 
and politics (formulation of political objectives) to various public policies -but 
its effects on each of these areas differ in size and scope. Furthermore, a set of 
theoretical proposals has been developed to explain convincingly the ambivalent 
effects that the difficult process of Europeanization causes in its confrontation 
with the different horizontal and vertical layers of the German federal govern­
mental system. In the following, the theories will be applied only generally to 
the basic institutions and policy sectors of the German political system to give 
an idea of the varying degree of the broader adaptive process that Germany, 
as a member state, has experienced through European integration. In this way 
the explanatory strength of those theories will become clear in a middle range 
perspective (see Table 1 and Sturm / Pehle 2001: 14-26).
Table 1: The Europeanised German political system
Sectors Dimension
Degree of Europeanization 
from 1 (state autonomy) 
to 10 (European State)
Theories explaining 
Europeanization
Federal Government polity 4 multi-level ‘win-set’
Bundestag (Parliament) polity 3 multi-level ‘win-set’
Bundesrat (Federal Council) polity 3 ‘joint decision’ thesis
Länder (States) polity 6 ‘joint decision’ thesis
Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(Federal Constitutional Court) polity 7 ‘fusion’
Interest Groups politics 7 ‘political networking’
Political Parties politics 3 ‘political culture’
Monetary Union policy 9 ‘institutionalisomorphism’
Agriculture policy 9 ‘fusion’
Environment policy 8 ‘regulatory regimes'
Regional Development policy 8 ‘political networking’
Justice and Home Affairs policy 7 ‘policy learning’
Source: Roland Sturm / Heinrich Pehle: Das neue deutsche Regierungssystem, Opladen 2001, 252 
(translated by the author).
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The modest Europeanization gains of federal government can best be 
explained by applying the formally dominant multi-level ‘win-set’ theory (Bul- 
mer / Bulmer 2000: 280). Is the nation-state revitalized by its symbiosis with 
the EU, as the inter-governmental approach (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1999) 
suggests, or does it, conversely, lose its significance, as the federalists assume? 
This theory suggests that the federal government has been able to optimize 
its national resources and copes more or less efficiently at the European level.
The pragmatic ‘joint decision’ thesis, on the other hand, explains how and 
why the compatible executive co-operative federal structures in Germany and 
the EU may lead to a stalemate -a ‘joint decision gap’ (Scharpf / Reissert / 
Schnabel 1976; Scharpf 1994)-, if institutional involvement in decision-ma­
king by permanent negotiations is too rigidly fixed by ‘political interconnec­
tedness’ (Politikverflechtung) (Luthardt 1996). Any decision on EU-legislation 
demanding a unified German vote is usually undermined by the absence of a 
powerful German decision center because of the antagonistic relations bet­
ween Bund and Länder. Länder governments, which dominate the less Euro- 
pliile Bundesrat, are typical role models for the intensive Europeanization of 
German executive federalism at the expense of the national (Bundestag) and 
the sub-national parliaments (Landtage) which lose further legislative compe­
tences to Europe and thus transparency and legitimacy. The Länder adminis­
trations are forced to collaborate not only with the Bund in Berlin but also 
directly with the core EU-institutions in Brussels to secure their economic 
and political survival. But the predicted ‘joint decision trap’ has not worked 
out when the German government, with its prime objective of safeguarding 
the introduction of the Euro (and EMU), actively supported further sacrifices 
of national sovereignty in the negotiations leading to the Maastricht (but less 
so in the Amsterdam and Nice) Treaties (Beuter 2002: 93).
The dynamic ‘fusion’ thesis (Wolfgang Wessels), on the other hand, ex­
plains the high degree of Europeanization within the German Federal Consti­
tutional Court: the growing significance of EU legislation in the national 
German legal arena necessitates a closer institutional cooperation with, and 
to the advantage of, the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Mean­
while, the symbiosis between German and EU agricultural policies is easily 
explained by the fact that in this policy field the EU and the member states 
share and manage powers, funds and regulatory instruments (package deals 
are the norm).
The ‘political culture’ approach highlights the traditional ‘beliefs systems’
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of the national political parties and clearly demonstrates the inherent limits 
of the German (and of the other member states) political parties to Europea­
nize at all because of the inexistence of an informed European demos. In spite 
of the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament for several 
decades, a European space for political party competition has not yet been 
evolved (Johansson & Zervakis 2002: 13; Mair 2000; Jachtenfuchs & Kohler- 
Koch 2003: 19, 39-40).
The best example for ‘institutional isomorphism’ is the Euro-Union, whe­
reas environmental policy is a good example of how policy sectors become 
Europeanized by the creation of transnational ‘regulatory regimes’. Regional 
policies and interest groups follow best the ‘political networking’ assumption 
because they are non-hierarchically organized, as regards competences shared 
between the EU, the nation-states and the regions.
Justice and home affairs policies are, finally, good examples of how ‘policy 
learning’ has led to legal Europeanization even outside the EU legislative 
area (see the Schengen Accords). Member states learn through ‘best practice’ 
and role models how to accommodate each other or to converge.
Today’s hard empirical evidence shows that the core democratic institu­
tions in Germany (including the directly or indirectly elected federal govern­
ment, parliament and Federal Council, as well as the strong political parties 
acting as institutionalized intermediaries between the polity and the politics 
dimensions which compete for political power gained by national elections) 
have successfully resisted Europeanization, as far as their convergence to a 
European state model is concerned (see Table 1 and Jachtenfuchs / Kohler- 
Koch 2003: 37). Though their policy decisions are not any longer shaped 
independently from Europe (degree 1), they are a long way from a fused 
system of European Governance (at the average degree only 3-4 in a scale up 
to 10). Conversely, the more economically oriented public policies have been 
Europeanized more eagerly and easily (at the average degree 9-7): agriculture 
(degree 9), currency union (degree 9), environment (degree 8), regional 
policies (degree 8), justice and home affairs (degree 7), and the majority of 
societal interest groups like farmers, professional, business and employers 
associations, trade unions etc. (degree 7). These policy-areas and actors are 
all more closely related to the above mentioned Europeanized political fields, 
in which hard decisions are made today mainly at the European level. These 
institutional actors from the member states’ civil society increasingly focus 
their individual demands at the EU-level by establishing representative fede-
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rai networking structures in Brussels (like COPA-COGECA). Hence, their 
influence is gradually reinforced, while they organize their transnational pre­
sence in rather loose federal structures in part to become influential and most 
‘gaining receptors of the European negotiation process’ (Zervakis / Yannis 
2001: 154).
In Germany, there is a sharp contrast between the reality of an ever 
growing number of Europeanized public policy sectors (with high degrees of 
Europeanization), which are regulated by comprehensive ‘package deals’ 
(Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice) and binding decisions in Brussels, and 
resistant German political institutions (with relatively low degrees in Euro­
peanization (Wessels / Rometsch 1996: 77). This leads to a long-term misper­
ception of the real strength of the EU by national elites. ‘The European 
decision-center is located in Brussels’, as Siedentopf enthusiastically 
concludes. But he may be overstating developments in assuming: ‘In the 
meantime nearly all activities of the national administrations (of the member 
states) are mainly determined by legal regulations derived from supranatio- 
nality’ (Siedentopf 1999: 84-85). Politicians, the media and parts of the aca­
demic community have been largely unaware of the full impact of the slow 
but constant changes that occurred in most of Germany’s public policies 
between 1950 and 2000 (see Table 2; Schmidt 1999: 11-12). It is evident that 
degrees of Europeanization in all policy fields and within specific policies vary 
in time and scope depending on whether political decisions are still taken 
solely by national processes (1) or already by a joint Community process (5). 
On average, decision-making in all of Germany’s national public policies is 
carried out by processes which do not conform to, what might be termed, a 
Community decision process (they were rated 2.4 in 2000) but they certainly 
show a growing tendency towards further Europeanization (in the sense of 
‘Communitarisation’). Thus a discrepancy can be diagnosed between percei­
ved and actual sovereignty transfers to Brussels. Evidently, public opinion 
moulders show little interest in differentiation, and perhaps even less, in the 
technocratic, relatively opaque and output-criented nature of the incremental 
Europeanization process. For instance, the verdicts of the European Court of 
Justice in Luxembourg have successfully transformed national judiciary but 
only as concerns the workings of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(7, see Table 1) and the general access to the EC/EU-Judiciary (4 in 
1992/2000, see Table 2). However, the overall German legal system is merely 
on the verge of becoming integrated (1.8 in 2000, see Table 2 and Hess 2003).
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Table 2:
The Europeanization of public policies in Germany, 1950-2000
Policies (in selection) 1950 1956 1968 1992 2000
Foreign Policies (average degree) 1* 1* 2* 2,5’ 2,5*
a) Military / Diplomacy 1 1 1/2 2 2
b) Foreign Trade 1 1 3 4 4
Institutional / Constitutional Policies 1 1 1 2,3 2,7
a) Direct election of the EP 1 1 1 4 4
b) EC/EU Citizenship 1 1 1 2 3
c) Direct election of EU executive 1 1 1 1 1
Justice and Home Affairs Policies 1 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8
a) Public security, law and order 1 1 1 1 2
b) Access to the EC/EU-Judiciary 1 2 3 4 4
c) Civil Code 1 1 1 1 1
Social Policies 1 1,2 1,3 1,6 1,9
a) Unemployment Security 1 1 1 1 1
b) Public Health Security / Services 1 1 1/2 1/2 2
c) Equality 1 2 2 3 3
d) Labor Migrants 1 2 2 4 4
Education and Science 1 1 1,4 1,8 1,8
a) School System 1 1 1 1 1
b) Universities / Vocational training 1 1 1 2 2
c) Research 1 1 3 3 3
d) Culture 1 1 1 1 1
Economy and Labor Market 1 1,2 1,8 2,5 3,2
a) Agriculture 1 1 4 4 4
b) Communication 1 1 1 2 2
c) Monetary/Currency 1 1 1 1 5
Environment and Energy 1 2 2 2,5 2,5
a) Energy 1 2 2 2 2
b) Environmental Protection 1 2 2 3 3
Average for all public policies in Germany I 1,2 1,5 2 2,4
Source: M. G. Schmidt: Die Europäisierung der öffentlichen Aufgaben, Bremen 1999, pp. 11-12 
(translated and abbreviated by the author).
* The figures symbolise:
1 = ‘all policy decisions by national process’
2 = ‘only the beginning of Community decision process’
3 = ‘policy decisions in both but national activity predominates’
4 = ‘policy decisions in both but Community activity predominates’
5 = ‘all policy decisions by joint Community process’
One may lament that the functional approach to integration that empha­
sizes solely efficiency, lacks transparency and parliamentary democracy, i.e. 
broader popular enthusiasm (electoral support of European Parliament’s
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participation in the EU legislative process) and mutual trust of the citizens 
(legitimacy). One can hardly be surprised by the fact that in the last 50 years 
or so the German governmental system has begun to converge with the EU 
and has lost its traditional nation-state autonomy to a considerable degree 
(Kohler-Koch 1998: 263-264, Kohler-Koch 2000: 13). On the other hand, this 
does not mean that European governance has simply replaced the national 
political system. If this were so, we could end our reflections on institutional 
continuity and change within the German political system in view of European 
membership right here, and turn to Hix’s bold suggestion ‘The Political Sys­
tem of the European Union’ (Hix 1999). However, not just since European 
integration accelerated in the direction of political union in the late 1980s/90s, 
has Germany been fully transformed into a ‘penetrated political system’ (Ro­
senau 1969; Sturm / Pehle 2001: 13). Direct European legal and political 
‘interference’ has been permitted by the openly-Europhile German Basic 
Law/Constitution (Preamble, articles 23 and 24, no.l) since the application 
of the Rome Treaties. Indeed, from its constitutional beginnings in 1948/49 
and, especially in its adaptation to the Maastricht Treaties, the German 
government has welcomed and legally enabled the broad transfer of soverei­
gnty rights to international organizations, including the EU, and has thus 
voluntarily integrated Germany’s future in Europe and the West (Bulmer / 
Burch 2000: 277; Goetz 1995: 93). It was only formally limited by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court’s Maastricht decision (Zervakis 2003: 310; Stef- 
fani 1997: 162-167). Thus, the post-war Federal Republic’s ‘Drang nach Wes­
ten’ has further been legitimated by its integration ‘in the process of creating 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe...’ (Article A, Treaty on 
the European Union).
Furthermore, in analyzing the Europeanization of national political sys­
tems, intergovernmental relations are of special significance, particularly in 
strongly decentralized or federalized polities. Not only do they comprise all 
political, institutional, procedural and organizational facets of possible and 
traceable changes in the federal administration, but the relations between 
local, regional (‘sub-central’ or Länder) and federal governments are also 
highly political and their interrelations a good indicator for testing the in­
fluence of Europeanization. Because the federal structure of the German 
polity is historically and constitutionally safeguarded, the close relations be­
tween the Bund (federal government and the European Union), the Länder 
(states) and inter -Länder relations as well as the local level (Städte and
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Kommunen) are crucial to the functioning of the German co-operative fede­
ralism (Verbunds-, or Verflechtungsföderalismus). They influence nearly all 
dimensions in German political life (Sturm 2003: 117). European integration 
is thereby a potentially powerful co-factor of domestic change and has some 
impact on those relations. The Länder’s executives, on the other hand, are in 
a relatively strong position mainly in the German domestic federal arena. 
They are political, governmental and administrative actors with their own 
constitutional rights to co-decide in federal legislation. This renders German 
co-operative federalism, with its decision-making processes in the Bundesrat, 
unique, not only in the EU, but also amongst other federal systems (Steffani 
1997: 64; Sturm 2003: 127). The Länder governments and, especially, their 
indirectly elected presidents (Ministerpräsidenten) have good reason to fear 
all sorts of power-erosion at the European level of governance, a development 
which would be to the advantage of the Bund. Therefore, they use their 
federal representation in the German Federal Council to shape not only key 
aspects of federal policy but also to ensure that their interests, assets and 
relative institutional strengths are not changed decisively by the effects of the 
integration process (Leonardy 2002b: 27).
However, the key question in this respect is to what extent national poli­
tics, governmental-administrative structures, policy-making procedures and 
the substance of public policies have really been changed in reaction to 
growing political and economic interventions from Brussels (top-down ap­
proach) as a result of dynamic German EU membership. Here the general 
assumption is that European integration has triggered a more informal adap­
tation process amongst the Länder, as far as their direct interest repre­
sentation in Brussels is concerned. But the ‘dramatic increase in Community 
and EU affairs’ has not seriously challenged the basic institutions of decision­
making in the German federal system between Bundesregierung and Bundesrat 
(Goetz 1995: 91; Wessels / Rometsch 1996: 99). On the contrary, Europeani­
zation has supported and, in some cases, even reinforced the core features of 
the intergovernmental German system.
The German federal system’s persistence to the EU’s integrative 
pressures
If we assume that soft domestic factors (like constitutional history and 
specific traditional elements in political culture), rather than dynamic Euro-
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pean integration, have shaped German intergovernmental institutions and 
federal arrangements in the last half a century (Jachtenfuchs / Kohler-Koch 
2003: 36), then we can find at least seven features inherent to the system. 
They have decisively shaped the persistence of German intergovernmental 
relations, which are practically immune to political change from above:
1. German federalism has favored the vertical and horizontal sharing of 
powers, responsibilities and resources (Verbundsystem) rather than their se­
paration and delineation into different layers of government like in the USA. 
Thus, the Länder’s executives extended their institutional influence on key 
federal legislation by extensively using the Bundesrat’s power of veto and 
supported by Federal Constitutional Court’s verdicts (Rechtsstaatsprinzip). In 
the meantime, more than 60% of all federal laws, and by far the most impor­
tant ones, require Bundesrat’s approval (zustimmungsbedürftige Gesetze) 
(Hesse / Ellwein 1992: 286).
2. Because the majority of national legislation requires the Bundesrat’s 
participation and approval, close collaboration, co-operation and co-ordina­
tion are essential between Bund and Länder and between the Länder in all 
stages of policy-making for joint policy- and decision-making in Germany’s 
stable co-operative federalism. This favors bargaining solutions at every level 
(Knill 2001: 91-92). For this purpose, strong multi-level inter-linkages of 
policy-making can be identified between the federal center (Bund) and sub­
central (Länder) levels of Germany government. Decision-making mecha­
nisms need a broad consensus mediated by strong parliamentary political 
parties (structured in federal, regional and local levels) to avoid stalemate, 
whenever the opposition parties hold a majority in the Federal Council (Stef- 
fani 1997: 145). No side can impose political solutions on the other and 
unanimity is often the rule in joint- decision-taking. If this is not the case, the 
‘joint-decision-trap’ can be triggered (Scharpf et al. 1976). Since the federal 
government, generally speaking, has no hierarchical administrative authority 
over the Länder’s executives, intergovernmental co-ordination has to be ob­
tained by complicated negotiations between autonomous administrative units. 
In these relations, the leading role of the Bund is counterbalanced by the 
Länder’s experience in administration and implementation. Such a structural­
ly and procedurally interlocked system of federal and regional executives, 
with no clear majority in the Federal Council for the governmental coalition, 
explains why only incremental changes to the balance of power occurred in
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Germany between the 1970s and 1982 and again, between the 90s and today 
(Jeffery 1999: 50-51; Sturm 2003: 128-129).
3. The continuous extension of federal legislative powers (exclusive, 
concurrent and framework legislation) into the Länder’s core competences 
(education, research, culture, internal affairs) and the determination of the 
Bund to use its powers fully, resulted in a high degree of Germany-wide legal, 
economic and social standardization at the expense of the Länder parlia­
ments’ legislative powers (see, for instance, the Bologna Process in higher 
university education in Zervakis 2004). Therefore, the increased Länder par­
ticipation in federal legislation can be regarded as a partial compensation for 
the loss of the legislative capacities in the states’ parliaments. This high degree 
of standardization can be seen as a direct consequence of the stipulations in 
the Basic Law, in combination with the Federal Constitutional Court’s ver­
dicts emphasizing categorically ‘the uniformity of living conditions’ through­
out the territory of the Federal Republic. This has proved to be counterpro­
ductive to the protection or promotion of diversity. However, contrary to 
common belief, German federalism is neither designed to protect the rights 
of ethnic, national and/or religious minorities nor to preserve particular re­
gional identities or promote cultural, economic or social diversity (Goetz 
1995: 95).
4. On the other hand, administrative competence for the execution of most 
federal and Länder legislation lies with the Länder. Although the German 
Constitution foresees certain exceptions (i.e. in foreign service, federal tax 
administration, army, border guards, railways, post office, audit etc.) where 
the Bund is empowered to create federal administrative authorities with their 
own regional substructures, the administrative capacities of the Länder are 
far superior to those of the federal institutions. For instance, in 1992, about 
6.3 million people were employed in the German public sector, although this 
figure decreased dramatically (in 2003: 4.76) within a decade of reunification 
(Goetz 1995: 95, footnote 3; Statistisches Bundesamt 2004: 1). Direct federal 
employment accounted in 1992 for only about 625,000 (in 2003: 491,000) 
people (including soldiers), whereas 642,000 civil servants (in 1992) were 
separately employed exclusively by the then Federal Post Office (in 2002: 
542,000), and 434,000 worked only for the public railways (in 2002: 249,912) 
and, therefore, were statistically counted only as indirect federal employment. 
In the meantime, post office and railways have been transformed into public 
listed companies under private law, thus lowering the size of federal employ-
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ment decisively because private employment law is increasingly applied to the 
employees there. But law implementation by the Länder is also under inter­
governmental co-ordination, since there is an extensive institutional network 
for harmonizing implementation practice among the German states, and vertical 
links between federal and the Länder*s technical departments are the rule.
5. Also there is clear leadership by the executives in the intergovernmental 
process, marginalizing the parliaments of the Länder (Landtage) and the 
Bundestag that are largely excluded from the highly fragmented and decen­
tralized intergovernmental decision-making process, including the European 
level. At the top of the joint policy-making system there are regular meetings 
among the Länder’s Presidents who then meet together with the Chancellor. 
In departmental terms, state ministers confer regularly with Federal minis­
ters, who are all relatively free from political intervent by their heads of 
government (Ressortprinzip in article 65 Basic Law; Ismayr 2003: 459). Be­
neath the top political level, an uncounted network of administrative commit­
tees of different status, and ad-hoc meetings has been established. These are 
constituted by higher and medium career public servants. This well-functio­
ning bureaucratic co-ordination machinery in the tradition of executive or 
administrative federalism or Verwaltungsföderalismus (Hesse / Ellwein 1992: 
88) prepares not only top-level political decisions but harmonizes and syn­
chronizes the smooth implementation of public policy. Landtage and Bundes­
tag have a hard time influencing and scrutinizing this intergovernmental po­
licy-making and implementation (Wessels / Rometsch 1996: 90-92; Sturm / 
Puhle 2001: 57-58). The fragmented but institutionally stable German admi­
nistrative federalism is resistant to any radical political change by party de­
mocracy and leaves virtually no space for political leadership because there 
are only limited chances for federal government to guide and control the 
administration of federal programs at the Länder level. As a consequence, 
reforms are somewhat evolutionary, incorporated in endless negotiations into 
package deals between the different levels of the German governmental 
system than introduced top-down (Knill 2001: 92).
6. To complete the picture of the complex nature of a stable German 
federal system, albeit one which has not responded well to external pressures, 
it is necessary to reflect on the strong political influence of the highly auto­
nomous German public administration. Though constitutionally-speaking it 
is purely instrumental to politics (article 20 of the German Basic Law foresees 
a clear division of power between policy formulation and implementation, and
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binds the administrators to the law), German bureaucracy has long legalist 
traditions, which preceded democracy (Rechtsstaat). The administration ef­
fectively influences the often open-ended and incomplete legislation during 
the implementation stage. Political and administrative arenas are partly over­
lapping because of urgently needed bureaucratic expertise (university and 
privately organized think tanks are of minor significance; see Thunert 2003: 
33, 35) that decisively shapes policy-making, and has seen the successive 
politicization of the top ranks of the civil service (politischer Beamter) by 
common party affiliation with the deputies, and the consequent professiona­
lization of politicians (many of whom are lawyers and higher civil servants). 
Thus, in contrast to the UK where politicians set the administrative agenda, 
in Germany there is a characteristic strong and continuous ‘interlinkage of 
politicians and bureaucrats’ (Knill 2001: 93) during policy formulation, de­
centralized implementation and enforcement in the fragmented German fe­
deral system giving civil servants a rather autonomous, political influential 
and powerful position within the fragmented German political system. Thus 
the reform ability of the flexible German bureaucracy is less politically inspi­
red but follows the given pattern of incremental self-adaptation with respect 
to existing traditions and principles.
7. German federalism is characterized by a virtual absence of regionalist 
or ethnic political cleavages. European integration has done little to upset regio­
nalist sensibilities, and thus incite opposition to its progress. Criticism of Germa­
ny’s European policy from the Bavarian government (one of the few Länder and 
city-states like Hamburg with a strong historical identity and legitimacy dating 
back to the times of Napoleon) remains the exception rather than the rale. 
Although politicians and administrators in the German states have been worried 
about the impact of Europe on their Länder’s position, it has less to do with 
regionalist traditions than with their goal of gaining and maintaining powers, 
financial resources and influence as well as a distinct policy profile in the multi­
layered Europeanized policy-making system (Sturm 2003: 119-123).
However, intensifying European integration has proved systemically 
compatible with the German mode of governance: multiethnic confederal 
European governance resembles in many ways the relatively ethnically homo­
geneous federal German ‘consensus model’ which, at the same time, has 
shown a remarkable openness to Europe since its beginnings (Bulmer / Bruch 
2000: 287; Lijphart 1999: 33-34, 42- 47; Nettesheim 2003). Both concentrate 
on close multi-level administrative ‘ex- post co-ordination’ (Derlien 2000: 56)
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and autonomous bureaucratic participation in the highly fragmented political 
decision-making process (Beteiligungsföderalismus in Sturm / Pehle 2001: 
250), clearly lacking efficiency, democratic transparency and parliamentary 
scrutiny (Hölscheidt 2001: 118). But the intransparent ‘comitology’ system in 
the EU (Blinder / Friedrich 2004: 19), on the other hand, is staffed with all 
sorts of experts from all the member states’ civil services and permits inter­
national co-operation in a ‘multi-level’ institutionalized bureaucracy ‘towards 
a new system of shared government’ (Wessels 1996: 80). The multiple insti­
tutionalized interactions between the national and the European levels are 
highly rewarding with regard to multi-issue bargaining and informal recipro­
city between the EU and the member states (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Institutional and administrative interaction 
in Germany over EU position
-------- 1 Noi directly involved in He
1-------1 administrative interaction process
Source: Wessels, W. & Rometsch, D. 1996: ‘German Administrative Interaction and European 
Union. The Fusion of Public Policies’, in: Mény, Y., Muller, P., Quermonne, J.-L. (eds), 
Adjusting to Europe. The Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies, 
London: Routledge, 73-109.
Growing Europeanization pressures and interventions from Brussels have 
supported and sometimes reinforced in several characteristic ways the basic 
features of German administrative federalism. Administrative federalism al-
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lows only evolutionary self-adaptation within the strict limits of existing inter­
governmental relations and administrative traditions without necessarily lea­
ding to an institutional convergence (Bulmer /Burch 2000: 268):
1. Since Maastricht, German intergovernmental relations have become 
increasingly Europeanized in substantive, structural and procedural terms. 
This has resulted in a steady transfer of competences from the national to the 
supranational level, thus, widening the range of public policy sectors ruled 
directly by the EU multi-level governance. Brussels established direct econo­
mic and political links with sub-national German governments, just as Länder 
executives struggled to gain improved access to EU-level decision-making 
process in order to secure own funds. However, in order to smoothly ac­
commodate the EU as a new domestic co-player, the sharing of powers within 
German administrative federalism had to be readjusted, rather than drama­
tically changed (Wessels / Rometsch 1996: 99). Therefore, national intergo­
vernmental relations remained the key element in the distribution of powers, 
responsibilities and resources in Germany.
2. Nor did the German style of intergovernmental decision-making have 
to be changed to follow Europeanization pressures because decentralized and 
fragmented joint-decision-making with unanimity, supported by institutiona­
lized veto powers, also characterize the EU decision-making system. There­
fore, political and policy effects seem to be similar in both cases. Despite the 
resistant German Länder’s demands for more subsidiarity (Leonardy 2002b: 
28), there is no clear evidence for a decline in national joint decision-making 
as a consequence of increased supranational joint decision-making (Goetz 
1995: 98; Sturm / Pehle 2001: 28).
3. But legal uniformity in Germany has been further stimulated and wide­
ned by the EU’s increased legislative output that has completed parallel 
efforts by the Bund. The rise in EU legislation has also increased further legal 
standardization efforts by intervening in exclusive Länder competences (re­
gional development, public services, higher education) with growing practical 
significance (Zervakis 2003: 300-303).
4. Integration could not change national policy implementation either, 
because the equally fragmented Commission has no resources to impose its 
views as a ‘superbureaucracy’ on the national administrations (Derlien 2000: 
67). The EU, in general, has no developed administrative substructures on its 
own and depends more or less completely on the member states’ bureaucra­
cies for the implementation of its own legislation and most of its promotional
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:05:49 |
122 Peter A. Zervakis
policies. It is up to the individual member state to establish the administrative 
structures and procedures to be used for this purpose. In federal Germany, 
existing national administrative competences between Bund and Länder have 
been used to apply to EU matters. Thereby, the predominance of the Länder 
in the implementation of EU legislation has been successfully secured. On 
the contrary, the tendency of European, federal and regional executives to­
wards interlocking could explain to a certain degree the suggested ’double 
joint-decision-trap’ (Hrbek 1986) where only evolutionary self-adaptation oc­
curs.
5. The EU has confirmed and even increased the traditional role of poli­
tical and administrative executives in the policy-making process. On the other 
side, the Bundestag’s direct influence and scrutiny on the federal govern­
ment’s position in Community-related matters has remained rather limited 
(Sturm / Pehle 2001: 72-73). And even the ‘Law on the co-operation between 
the federal government and the German Bundestag on matters relating to the 
European Union’ from 1993 could not decisively change the predominant 
position of the German governments in the Union. The Länder legislatures 
have historically been even in a weaker position to influence European inte­
gration. This is mainly due to the fact that the German states, in their attempt 
to strengthen their roles vis-a-vis Brussels and Berlin, have overemphasized 
their state executives’ legislative functions in the Bundesrat. Consequently, 
their legislative participation in the Bundesrat on EU affairs was considerably 
strengthened domestically. With the Amsterdam negotiations it became ap­
parent that the Länder have evolved into ‘a force to be reckoned with’ (Beuter 
2002: 118).
Finally, though the dynamics of European integration have been fully 
accommodated within the existing fundamental organizational framework of 
the federal intergovernmental system in Germany, it led to some important 
functional re-adaptations and formal adjustments in the aftermath of Maas­
tricht.
Adaptation and adjustments of the German intergovernmental 
system after Maastricht
Dynamic developments at the European level after the Treaty of Maas­
tricht have lead to some significant political adaptations and formal legal 
adjustments in German intergovernmental relations, mostly through the in­
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corporation of EU matters into the existing institutional framework of natio­
nal government (Bulmer / Burch 2000: 287). But in the emerging multi-level 
European polity, the Länder in particular developed a three-stage more or 
less defensive strategy to protect their institutional self-interests in Germany 
and the EU (Goetz 1995: 101; Hiittmann / Knodt 2000: 32). With mixed 
blessings, they concentrated on demanding
a) an effective subsidiarity as a preventive protection strategy against 
perceived further excessive EU interventions in certain domestic policy fields 
falling under their own competence,
b) a better representation and a direct access to the decision-making 
centers in Brussels, and
c) an increase of their legal participation and political significance in 
influencing the Federal Republic’s integration policy.
Pragmatically seen, only the last objective promised satisfactory results for 
the Länder because agreement on the other demands depended on the diffi­
cult consensus-building mechanism between all EU member states. Mean­
while, because the German government urgently needed the Bundesrat’s ap­
proval to ratify the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties for domestic reasons, 
the Länder had, in this point alone, a valuable bargaining chip (Hiittmann / 
Knodt 2000: 33-36; Beuter 2002: 101-104; Goetz 2000: 101-108):
a) Demand for Subsidiarity
The precise formulation and recognition of subsidiarity as a key constitu­
tional and legal principle of the EU, comprising a clear division of powers 
between the EU, the member states and the regions with a listing of exclusive 
EU competences has been a central demand of the German Länder ever since 
the ratification of the Single European Act and, more intensively, during the 
negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaties (Beuter 2002: 102-103; Goetz 
1995: 102; Leonardy 2002a). But though the Länder regularly try to restrict 
Union involvement in regulatory policies, they do not resist additional EU 
funding for the promotion of regional economic development. At the same 
time, they criticize somewhat hypocritically the Commission’s stronger in­
fluence in defining, selecting and controlling the EU funded regional projects 
and lament the increased ‘bureaucratic burden’. The Länder’s ambivalence 
with regard to finances is similar to their position on the Bund’s involvement 
in exclusive Länder policy competences. While the German states stress the 
need for maintaining their policy autonomy, they take additional subsidies
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and special incentives from the Bund (in co-funding programs and in federal 
initiatives like the current one by the federal Ministry of Education estab­
lishing all-day schooling) leading to the erosion of sub-central policy-making. 
On the other hand, attempts by the Länder to ‘keep the Union out’ cannot 
be realized in the long run because the Länder simply have not the means to 
counterbalance the expansion of EU promotional and regulatory activities in 
their regions (Bielzer 2003; Böttcher / Krawczynski 2002).
b) Representing the Länder in Brussels
Prior to Maastricht the German Länder had already gained some institu­
tional standing at the EU level to somewhat counterbalance their information 
deficits as regards the federal government. Since the late 1950s, and until the 
end of the 80s, a ‘Länder Observer with the European Communities’, which 
could act only unofficially, was installed in the Bundesrat with offices in Bonn 
and Brussels. As a kind of passive member of the German delegation to the 
Council of Ministers, he was to participate at negotiations, but merely to 
improve the Bundesrat’s access to information on Community developments. 
Though, in 1979, the Länder started to nominate their own representatives in 
the German delegation to the Council, the information on EU decisions 
provided by the Observer’s office was not regarded any longer as specific 
enough to satisfy individual Länder interests. Because his function as a direct 
source of information is limited to the traditional domestic Länder participa­
tion in federal legislation, the Observer’s office is not meant to be engaged 
in individual lobbying activities of the Länder influencing EU legislation 
(Goetz 1995: 103-104; Hiittmann / Knodt 2000: 36-37).
As a reaction, by 1988, all individual (West German) Länder had founded 
their own liaison and information offices (Länder-, Verbindungs-, or Informa­
tionsbüros) in Brussels and the East German Länder soon followed the exam­
ple. Though the new Länder representations vary significantly in size, perso­
nal and financial resources and their effectiveness in influencing EU decisions 
is debatable, they are seen as essential to the direct personal representation 
and lobbying of each German state at the Commission. In this sense they are 
engaged in close political and administrative collaboration on EU matters 
with the Länder’s Permanent Representations for federal matters in the Bund 
in Berlin (Pahl 2003: 1).
With the strategy of continuous direct representation in Brussels, the 
Länder executives mastered the intelligence problems of obtaining relevant
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information from the EU institutions and passing them on in time to their 
relevant administrative units in Berlin and Länder capitals. With the Treaty 
of Maastricht, effective Länder influence in Brussels was further channeled 
by the creation of the Committee of the Regions (Art. 198). Though the 
German states could not prevent the federal government from restricting the 
Committee’s function to advising the EU on regional policy, the Länder acted 
as a ‘prime catalyst’ and political agenda-setter for the enthusiastically recei­
ved ‘Europe of the Regions’ (Borkenhagen 1992). Through intensive networ­
king with other sub-central regional governments (like the Spanish Autono­
mous Communities) the German Länder played a key role in creating and 
strengthening institutions and mechanisms for institutionalized interregional 
and transnational co-operation in the Union (Conrad 2003). But, in the 
meantime, the German states have had to painfully learn that their influence 
in the Committee is rather limited because of seemingly insurmountable 
policy and constitutional differences between the relatively powerful German 
delegation (24 seats with only 3 seats for elected local government delegates) 
and the majority of the weaker and heterogeneously structured regional de­
legates from all the other - mainly centrally governed - member states (Goetz 
1995: 104-105).
It is problematic to assess whether the Länder’s growing access to deci­
sion-making in Brussels is equal to their growing influence at the EU-level. 
But the increase in institutionalized influence of the Länder led to some 
decisive changes in national power-sharing with the Bund in EU matters.
c) Adaptation in power-sharing arrangements at the national level
The Länder have been most successful in realizing their third objective 
within the domestic context because the necessity of the Bundesrat to agree 
on the Maastricht Treaty provided them with direct and powerful pressure 
vis-a-vis the Bund. As a consequence, the power sharing relations between 
Bund and Länder in EU-related policy-making, which until the 70s had been 
completely under the dominance of federal government, changed more to the 
advantage of the German states. At the same time, however, inter-Länder 
co-ordination, co-operation and joint decision-making concerning EU-related 
matters in the Bundesrat had to be intensified and were further institutiona­
lized. In order to achieve a consensual Länder position, effective horizontal 
co-ordination proved to be a precondition for successful vertical co-operation. 
Besides the factually non-working European Chamber (founded in 1988 and
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rarely in session) and the Co-operation law (in 1993), the Conference of 
Ministers of European Affairs of the Länder (since 1992) has brought inter­
departmental coordination on EU-matters into line with standard federal 
practice and further domesticated European policy. And the Länder through 
their European Commission (Europakommission) co-operated extremely clo­
sely in developing a common position, especially in the Maastricht negotia­
tions. But this common bargaining eroded afterwards due to political diffe­
rences between the parties. These adaptive reactions to the progress in Eu­
ropean integration have not been able to really push any of the established 
features of German Bund-Länder federalism in the direction of a closer 
institutional convergence with European governance (Bulmer / Burch 2000: 
287).
In relation to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the German Basic 
Law had to be amended in two places to comply with the Treaty’s provisions:
• Amendment to article 28 grants Union citizens the right to stand and vote 
in local government elections.
• Amendment of article 88 transfers powers of the Bundesbank to the Eu­
ropean Central Bank.
As a kind of compensation for the Länder’s consent to revise the German 
constitution, the domestically regulated Bund-Länder relations were integra­
ted into the framework of European integration. The constitutional changes, 
adopted in 1992, include:
• The amendment to article 50 Basic German Law. The Länder received 
additional participation rights in all ‘matters concerning the European 
Union’ through the Bundesrat.
• An addition to article 52 (3) Basic German Law. It provides for the 
Bundesrat to form a separate European Chamber (Europakammer) to take 
all decisions concerning EU matters.
• The insertion of a new article 23 Basic German Law on European Union. 
It upgrades Bund-Länder co-operation on EU matters.
• The revision of article 146 (1) EEC Treaty together with article 23 (6) 
Basic German Law that already confirms basically established practice. In 
case of matters in the interest of the Länder the Bund may include Länder 
representatives in the German delegation but will continue to lead the 
negotiations. ‘Where essentially the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the 
Länder is affected’ a representative of the Länder executives nominated 
by the Bundesrat may exercise the rights of the German federation and
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EU Member State as an exception to the rule and only ‘with the partici­
pation of and in agreement with the Federal government’ keeping full 
responsibility for the federation (article 23, 6).
For the first time and after hard domestic lobbying from the side of the 
Länder, the revised German constitution accepts in principle and in compli­
cated language the right of the Länder executives in the Bundesrat to co-par- 
ticipate with the federal government in legislation and administration concer­
ning all EU matters. That the Länder governments are now able through the 
Bundesrat to impose, under certain circumstances, their co-ordinated EU-re- 
lated views on the federal government in important policy sectors marks a 
major change in the Bund-Länder balance of power. Whereas at its inception, 
European integration was treated as foreign policy and thus the Bund (the 
German foreign ministry) had sole competence, since Maastricht European 
policy has been fully integrated into German domestic policy. This means that 
not only are the exclusive competences of the foreign ministry more and more 
contested by the other federal ministries (i.e. economic and finance) but the 
Länder governments via the Bundesrat are now equal actors in those areas in 
which European integration affects Germany, and have redressed the balance 
of power with the Bund. However, the possible representation of the Bund in 
the EU Council of Ministers by a member of a German state government is 
mainly of ‘symbolic significance’ (Goetz 2000: 106). As a consequence, EU- 
related decision-making has finally been legally integrated into the predomi­
nantly German federal principle of sharing powers and responsibilities be­
tween the Bund and the Länder governments. Additionally, Article 23 consti­
tutionalizes, specifies and extends only marginally the Länder’s participatory 
rights, and only in exceptional cases (Leonardy 2002b: 31). Together with the 
Bund- Länder Co-operation Law (in 1993), it provides for increasing co-ope­
ration procedures in EU-related matters: Where Länder interests are concer­
ned in exclusive federal EU legislation, the Bund is not bound by the Bundes­
rat’s majority view but just has ‘to take into account the opinion of the 
Bundesrat’ in its negotiations (article 23,5). But when the Länder’s legislative 
powers, their authorities or their administrative procedures are directly affec­
ted by the EU, the Bundesrat’s opinion needs to be given ‘due consideration’ 
in the decision-making of the Bund. If no agreement can be reached between 
federal and sub-central institutions, then a decision taken by the Bundesrat 
with a two-thirds majority is binding on the federal government. However,
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the federal government’s approval is still required in matters with budgetary 
implications for the Bund (Goetz 1995: 106-108).
Although in legal terms the Länder gained some constitutional recognition 
of their share in the legislation and administration of Union-related matters, 
notably the newly won power to impose a Bundesrat opinion as binding on 
the Bund, the rules are so complicated that they can only work if Bund and 
Länder (and thus the federal parties comprising the governmental majority 
and opposition) continue to cooperate in a mutually compromising atmos­
phere. At the same time, it is still to be seen whether the Bundesrat will be 
able to translate its newly won legal powers in EU matters into formative 
political influence. The impression dominates that the Länder continue to 
restrict their rights to a simply reactive veto power in the Bundesrat trying to 
maintain the traditional balance of institutional powers with the federal go­
vernment without initiating new political ideas to enhance the Bundesrat’s 
role in European integration. Thus, together with the German parliaments, 
this chamber may factually be well regarded as one of the losers of Europea­
nizing the German governmental system in the long run (Sturm / Pehle 2001: 
85).
As a consequence of the different adjusting processes due to dynamic EU 
integration, the German principle of executive/administrative dominance 
continues. The need for inter-Länder coordination through the Bundesrat 
means that regional Länder parliaments still lack effective access to the fede­
ral and European decision-making process. In the Bundesrat it is exclusively 
the executives that are engaged in permanent negotiations. The Länder dele­
gates cannot be bound by state parliaments to follow a particular political 
line. European integration has induced various formal institutional adjus­
tments in the German intergovernmental system but the adaptive pressures 
have not been able to change pre-existing national intergovernmental arran­
gements (Wessels / Rometsch 1996: 99; Olsen 2002: 934).
Europeanization: a catalyst to domestic transformation?
Although the German case offers no blueprint for the Europeanization of 
other EU member states with strongly decentralized or federalized govern­
mental-administrative systems (like Belgium or Spain), it provides for some 
interesting insights which might be useful for further comparative purposes:
a) Federalism and decentralization is compatible with European integra-
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tion. The degree of federalization matters less than the structural and proce­
dural features of the intergovernmental system that influence issues of 
compatibility between national and European dimensions.
b) In evaluating the impact of integration on national intergovernmental 
systems, the historically developed systemic national characteristics matter 
most. If analysis is restrained purely to power shifts between the different tiers 
of government, then Europeanization gives rise to systemic transformation 
and convergence of national systems of governance. But then the fact is not 
respected that German intergovernmental relations have integrated the EU 
dimension without endangering or seriously questioning the key features of 
its national model of government. Instead, Europe has affirmed and even 
reinforced German intergovernmental relations by extending them to the EU 
decision-making process (Goetz 1995: 111).
c) Finally, Europeanization may also work as a tool to legitimate political- 
ideological change, to internally stabilize the own model of regional economic 
success and to successfully export the competitive sub-national model to other 
European regions (Knodt 2000: 258). After the Maastricht debate the Länder 
shifted their interest in Europeanization from continuously developing their 
direct or indirect representation in Brussels to the protection of their exclu­
sive competences in European governance. Therefore, in the framework of 
the Amsterdam Treaty the German Länder governments under the leadership 
of conservative Bavaria sought to secure their prerogatives over sectors of 
national legislation, especially concerning environment and immigration 
(Beuter 2002: 108). By ceasing to focus upon inter-institutional co-operation 
in EU matters, the Länder tried to strengthen the subsidiarity principle fur­
ther by vigorously demanding its application in practice and thus expecting 
more autonomy. In constitutional terms the Länder wanted a new clear deli­
neation and re-distribution of competences between the EU, the federal 
government and the Länder, not excluding the re-nationalization of certain 
already Europeanized public policy sectors like agriculture (Leonardy 2002a: 
129). At the same time, those of the economically more successful Länder 
that were ruled by the Christian-conservatives (then in the minority in the 
Bundesrat) also intended to make use of European subsidiarity for their own 
ideological and competitive advantages (Hüttmann / Knodt 2000: 37-38). By 
combining the discussions on subsidiarity at the EU-level, with those deter­
mining how to enhance the Union’s problem-solving capacities and how to 
democratize the EU (and using positively determined terms like ‘efficiency’
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and ‘more transparency for the people’) they tried to promote a systemic 
change from co-operative federalism to implementing more market competi­
tion in inter -Länder, as well as European inter-regional, relations (Wettbe­
werbsföderalismus). As expected, those objectives to vigorously reform Euro­
pean governance and German federalism by strengthening regional inde­
pendence and individual responsibility met with resistance from the German 
Social-democrats. But the ideas continue to dominate the debate on refor­
ming German federalism and re-exporting it in the EU that inspired this 
liberal political party platform a long while ago when Jacques Delors acted 
as president of the EU-Commission (Wachendorfer-Schmidt 2003).
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